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DIRECTIONS '77 PROGRAM

AMERICAN FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION SERVICE

Guest: Admiral Stansfield Turner,
Director of CIA

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LIVE TAPE TRANSCRIPTION

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(taping session)

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. USCHOLD: Our guest on Directions is Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence.

We'll be discussing the key issues involving the intelligence community and the Department of Defense.

Admiral Turner, many people when they think of the Central Intelligence Agency conjure up the idea of a mystical Mission Impossible organization: the cloak and dagger, trench coat, the Agent 007 kind of thing. How would you characterize Central Intelligence?

ADMIRAL TURNER: The secret agent part of our business out here at the Central Intelligence Agency is a very important but a relatively small part of our activities.

The Central Intelligence Agency was created in 1947 to have one central focal point for intelligence in this country that was not related to policy making as are the Department of Defense and the Department of State.

So one of the most important functions we play here is to collate and bring together all of the intelligence that is derived in all of the agencies of the Government that play a part in intelligence.

1 That's a massive analytic function. It's
2 like a major research organization in a university.
3 That's perhaps the biggest activity here. The covert,
4 secretive collection of intelligence is another and
5 important part. It's one of the contributors to that.

6 But the major thing we do here is really
7 research.

8 MR. USCHOLD: There has been some criticism
9 of the covert operations, the dirty tricks aspect. Is
10 there a need for this?

11 ADMIRAL TURNER: There is primarily a need to
12 have a standby capability to do covert action. Covert
13 action is trying to influence events in other countries
14 as opposed to collecting intelligence.

15 They are really separate functions. It happens
16 that the Congress resided the covert action function in
17 the Central Intelligence Agency. It could have been
18 put other places.

19 There are situations such as the possibility
20 that a terrorist group might gain access to a nuclear
21 weapon, and this country would be very unhappy I think if
22 we did not have a standby covert action capability to
23 influence that kind of a situation.

24 MR. USCHOLD: How great is that potential
25 for a terrorist group, really, to get their hands on

1 a nuclear weapon?

2 ADMIRAL TURNER: It's always a considerable
3 danger by means of theft. It's a considerable danger
4 should we have more nuclear proliferation into more and
5 more countries of the world whose security procedures
6 with their weapons might not be as good as ours.

7 We are quite confident that ours are secure.

8 MR. USCHOLD: Your position now as Director
9 of Central Intelligence takes in more than just the
10 CIA itself. I wonder if you would explain that.

11 ADMIRAL TURNER: The law of 1947 provides
12 that I have two jobs: Director of Central Intelligence
13 and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

14 The latter, the Agency, is just one element
15 of the intelligence community, we call it. As Director
16 of Central Intelligence, I'm responsible for coordinating
17 all of the intelligence activities in the United States
18 Government, including those in the Department of
19 Defense, the Department of State, the Treasury Depart-
20 ment, the F.B.I. and so on; that is, the intelligence
21 part of the F.B.I., not the law enforcement part of it.

22 If they acquire intelligence in the process
23 of law enforcement, they turn it over to us, and we do
24 that.

25 In this degree, I have some authority over all

1 the elements of intelligence in the Department of
2 Defense.

3 There is a fine line here of shared control
4 with the Secretary of Defense because they are his
5 elements, he gets the budget for them, and basically
6 operates them; I give the overall direction as to what
7 is desired.

8 As Director of Central Intelligence Agency,
9 I am actually the operating head of one of the many
10 components of the intelligence community.

11 MR. USCHOLD: Now within the Department of
12 Defense there is the Defense Intelligence Agency. Is
13 there a duplication of effort?

14 ADMIRAL TURNER: There is a degree of dupli-
15 cation of effort between the research function and the
16 Department of Defense's Intelligence Agency, the CIA's
17 Research Intelligence Agency, and the State Department's
18 research function, and that's a very desirable thing
19 because when you interpret the facts of intelligence
20 there is never a right or a wrong answer; it's a matter
21 of interpretation, understanding, and you want different
22 viewpoints, and there is why we like to have a sort of
23 competing analysis situation between Defense, State, and
24 the CIA and, in some cases, Treasury and other elements
25 in particular specialties.

1 MR. USCHOLD: It seems somewhat incongruous
2 that here we have an admiral who is the Director of
3 Central Intelligence reporting to the President, but
4 yet over on the other side you have the Department of
5 Defense and an intelligence community there.

6 I should think that the admiral in this case
7 the chain of command would be through the Joint Chiefs
8 and the Secretary, of course, and then to the President.
9 I wonder if you would explain that relationship.

10 ADMIRAL TURNER: Again, back to the law of
11 1947 which established this operation, it specifically
12 provides that the Director of Central Intelligence may
13 be an active duty or a retired military officer or a
14 civilian.

15 It also provides that if it is an active duty
16 military officer he will carry out no responsibilities
17 to the Department of Defense or report to anybody in
18 the Department of Defense.

19 So I am prohibited from being in any way
20 subordinate to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
21 or even the Secretary of Defense with regard to my
22 business.

23 I do hold my military rank and privileges and
24 my military pay.

25 MR. USCHOLD: That's another question that I

1 know has been presented to you a number of times as some
2 charge that you're really using this position as a
3 stepping stone, that you are, should I say, a transient
4 custodian of CIA, and that ultimately you would like to
5 be Chief of Naval Operations or even Chairman of the
6 Joint Chiefs.

7 I wonder if you would tell us what your
8 personal goals, your- personal career goals, are in this
9 case.

10 ADMIRAL TURNER: I've had the same career
11 goal for 31 years, John, and that's to serve this
12 country in the best way I can.

13 On the 3rd of February the President asked
14 me to come back here, and I didn't know why. When he
15 told me he thought I could best serve the country as
16 the Director of Central Intelligence, I gave him the
17 standard answer: aye, aye, sir: if that's what you want
18 me to do, I'll do it.

19 In the future I'll do the same thing: If he
20 wants me to leave and retire and become a civilian, I'll
21 do that.

22 If he wants me to go to a military spot of
23 any sort, I'll do that. I would suspect that there's
24 a real need for the incumbent in my place to stay here
25 a while.

1 We've had too many Directors of the CIA and
2 Central Intelligence in the last few years. For
3 unfortunate reasons, people have only stayed short
4 terms, and that's not good for as important an organi-
5 zation as this.

6 Finally, let me just say that I'm offended
7 when people accuse me of stepping stoning. I did not
8 ask for this job. I am very pleased to have it.

9 It's an honor to have it, and there's a
10 tremendously important task to be done for our country
11 here, and I'm pleased to have been given that responsi-
12 bility.

13 But I'm not sitting here looking for what I
14 can get tomorrow; I am interested in serving our
15 country as well as I can today.

16 MR. USCHOLD: Being here only a short time,
17 nevertheless, some say that your running of the CIA,
18 that you run a tight ship and that has caused some
19 morale problems.

20 How do you look at this?

21 ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, we have a saying in
22 the Navy that a taut ship is a happy ship. Yes, I
23 always like to run a taut ship.

24 I don't believe there is a morale problem
25 out here. I think there is some concern at this time

1 because there's lots of discussion in the newspapers
2 of a major reorganization of the intelligence community.

3 And if you can put yourself in the shoes of
4 these dedicated people here in the Intelligence Agency,
5 you realize that they have been under attack in the
6 press, under investigation by the Congress for 2-1/2
7 years.

8 Now somebody is talking about reorganizing,
9 and naturally they are concerned. They want to know
10 what's going to happen.

11 That's the principal morale problem here,
12 and we're doing everything we can to resolve that as
13 quickly as we can because they deserve to know what the
14 future is going to be.

15 But I can only say that although the details
16 are still being ironed out in the executive branch
17 and with the Congress, there is no question that we
18 must have a strong intelligence community and that the
19 CIA is going to be an important part of it.

20 MR. USCHOLD: Before coming to this position,
21 you were over in Europe and in a position as Commander
22 and Chief of Allied Forces, Southern Europe.

23 Based upon your experience there and your
24 present position, how do you perceive the strength of
25 NATO vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact countries?

1 ADMIRAL TURNER: I still think NATO has an
2 edge on the Warsaw Pact countries in all important
3 categories of warfare.

4 At the same time, the growing strength of
5 the Warsaw Pact, particularly on ground forces in
6 Central Europe, is an alarming trend, and we must con-
7 tinue to match that growing strength or we will be in
8 a position of inferiority.

9 I think, however, John, that you must look
10 to the fact that NATO is a free alliance of 15 nations
11 who voluntarily get together, and they sometimes squabble
12 with each other, and it comes out in the public like the
13 very debilitating dispute between the Greeks and the
14 Turks during the last several years, which hurts the
15 Alliance.

16 But in the long run, there is strength in the
17 freedom to have different opinions and to dispute because
18 you don't have that in the Warsaw Pact.

19 There is one boss, one dominating country,
20 and I'm not sure the Soviets can fully count on the
21 alliance that they've got; I'm sure that we can if the
22 chips are down in ours.

23 MR. USCHOLD: What about President Carter's
24 plan to withdraw ground troops from South Korea and
25 General (Singloves) concern over this; does that have

1 any validity as far as you are concerned?

2 ADMIRAL TURNER: I think that you have to
3 appreciate that we've had 24 years of peace in Korea,
4 and that means to me there's been a relative stability,
5 a relative military balance.

6 The other side, which I think is an aggressive
7 undemocratic nation, has not found it propitious to
8 take any military action, so in some sense there's
9 been a stand-off.

10 When the United States pulls its some
11 33,000 ground forces out of Korea, the situation
12 clearly will change.

13 But the issue, John, will be what can be
14 done between now and the withdrawal of those forces
15 to replace their fighting capability: not necessarily
16 man for man and tube for tube and tank for tank, but
17 their overall capability.

18 And I think that it's quite possible that that
19 capability can be absorbed by the South Korean armed
20 forces.

21 We'll have to watch and see. And it's my
22 job to continually assess that balance. There is a
23 balance today, and as it goes along with the withdrawal
24 and replacement, I'll be trying to advise the President
25 on whether we think that balance is maintained.

1 MR. USCHOLD: Now in assessing the situation,
2 whether it be in Korea or wherever in the world, how
3 do you go about this? What factors bear on this
4 assessment, and how do you obtain this kind of infor-
5 mation?

6 ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, that's a pretty big
7 question, but we have to try to meld together all of the
8 intelligence inputs that we get.

9 We get that from unclassified sources, reading
10 newspapers, magazines, talking with people who travel.
11 We get it from various technical means of collection.
12 We get it from the clandestine collection of the CIA
13 with what could be described as spies.

14 We have to bring all this information
15 together and piece the clues together. It's sometimes
16 fascinating because a clue over here that appears to
17 have no relationship to another one over here, a smart
18 analyst, a smart researcher, will bring together and
19 draw a conclusion from.

20 So we do this. We have to try to get the
21 best estimate we can on what in this case the military
22 forces of North Korea have, how well-trained they are:
23 watching their training exercises in all the different
24 ways that we can.

25 Then we have to also look even broader than

1 that and say what's the North Korean economy, what
2 will they be able to afford in the way of armed forces
3 improvement over the next five years, and weigh all that
4 into a balance and then turn to a military analysis which
5 says: all right, if they've got this many forces and
6 we've got this many, but we're in a defensive posture,
7 they're in an offensive posture, which is the assumption
8 here, can we handle it. It's only 20-some miles from
9 Seoul to the border. That's a particular military
10 problem that has to be judged very carefully. It's not
11 easy, and the answers are never concrete and exact.

12 MR. USCHOLD: In this work of gathering this
13 information, do you work with, or do your people work
14 with our military people around the world in various
15 bases?

16 ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, absolutely. A major
17 input to an assessment of balance in Korea will come
18 from the DIA itself.

19 And just a few weeks ago I spoke with the
20 Chief of Staff of the United Nations Command in Korea.
21 He came out here, and we had a long talk about the
22 military balance on that front.

23 So we're interested in the views of the
24 commanders on the scene, their intelligence officers.
25 We're interested in the opinions of the Department of

1 Defense, and we bring it all together.

2 MR. USCHOLD: A while back you mentioned the
3 fact that you wear more than one hat. This must keep
4 your work day well-occupied. What is your typical day
5 like?

6 ADMIRAL TURNER: I usually get to the office
7 at 8:00; we usually have a staff conference out here at
8 9:00 and spend 30 or 40 minutes around the table seeing
9 what are the key items of the day; about every other day
10 I'm up on the Hill before Congress in some form or
11 another. I was there for 3-1/2 hours yesterday morning
12 in one form of testimony or another.

13 Twice a week I have an appointment with the
14 President to give him an intelligence update, and that
15 takes a lot of preparation, of course, so that will mean
16 the day before that I will try to spend two to three
17 hours in the office working on that and calling in
18 analysts who will tell me things that are important to
19 bring to the President's attention.

20 There are frequent meetings of the National
21 Security Council and its sub-organizations. We had
22 one before the decision was made on Korea, for instance,
23 that you just asked me about, and we all put our opinions
24 on the table so they could be sent to the President.

25 So there's these various meetings. Then,

1 obviously, as anyone in charge of a large organization,
2 you've got a myriad of details and lots of people you
3 have to see in your own organization to keep the thing
4 running day by day.

5 MR. USCHOLD: This position now, has this
6 changed your personal life style at all? Do you find
7 yourself looking over your shoulder a little bit more?

8 ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, I'd like to be back in
9 Napoli. That was nice. No, I enjoy this very much,
10 but it is quite a different life style than any military
11 job that I had, simply because I'm dealing in a different
12 arena: this is the national scene, not the military
13 scene.

14 It's no more important, but it's different,
15 and it's very interesting, but it's very demanding of
16 my time.

17 MR. USCHOLD: What do you do to unwind with
18 all the pressure?

19 ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I have a good friend
20 who's a vice admiral and he lives not far down the street,
21 and we get out 6:30 in the morning twice a week and
22 then usually again on Saturday and hit the tennis ball
23 around, and if I can beat him in the morning, it really
24 makes my day. I'm ready to go.

25 MR. USCHOLD: And if you lose?

1 ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, then the poor staff
2 is in bad shape that day when I come in all grumpy.

3 MR. USCHOLD: What about Mrs. Turner, how
4 is she taking on this new role here?

5 ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, she's a good sport.
6 She sees a lot of me, but I'm always sitting there at
7 home at night reading and working.

8 But there are, of course, some interesting
9 social activities that we get involved in, and she
10 enjoys those.

11 MR. USCHOLD: A while back when President
12 Carter announced his energy plan, the CIA released a
13 report on the worldwide energy situation. Of course
14 you got some criticism for that.

15 I wonder if you would (1) address that
16 aspect: the criticism, why did this come about and (2)
17 what is your assessment of the worldwide energy
18 situation.

19 ADMIRAL TURNER: On the first point we were
20 criticized because they thought the CIA was being used
21 for a political purpose.

22 I can only assure you that absolutely is not
23 the truth. The study had been in process for over a
24 year. I did not know it was under way; I'd only been
25 here a couple of weeks when it was delivered to my

1 desk. Now what would you do, John: you have a report
2 of great significance to a decision the President is
3 in the process of making?.

4 Clearly, I had to provide it to him because
5 it was important to him. We talked about it, and once
6 he had made his decision and announced his energy pro-
7 gram, it seemed that it was such an important factor
8 that it was worth the public of the United States
9 knowing.

10 MR. USCHOLD: I understand now you even said
11 that you were going to make more material of this
12 nature--not necessarily on energy--but more of this
13 available to the public.

14 ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes.

15 MR. USCHOLD: Why is that?

16 ADMIRAL TURNER: I said that before that
17 report was issued. In fact, one of the first policies
18 I instituted out here was a program of declassifying
19 information when it could be declassified.

20 And we had before that report came up several
21 projects already under way and which are still under
22 way.

23 My feeling is that the public pays a lot of
24 money for this institution, and they're deserving of
25 its product when it can be shared with them and that

1 this country will be stronger if it has a well-informed
2 public, and to the extent that we can contribute to
3 that without endangering the security of our infor-
4 mation, we're going to be better.

5 MR. USCHOLD: Before we get into the energy
6 question, what are some of the other subject areas that
7 you will be releasing material on?

8 ADMIRAL TURNER: Let me say to begin with that
9 this is not an entirely new policy out here. The CIA
10 for years has published a lot of unclassified informa-
11 tion, which is available through the Library of Congress
12 to anybody who wants it.

13 We have many atlases of specific areas of the
14 world where there are problems.

15
16
17
18
19 And we intend just to push that a little bit
20 more. I'd like to put out things about the world
21 economy, what are the prospects for different minerals,
22 what is the overall prospect for the economies of
23 major areas of the world: China, the Soviet Union,
24 Eastern Europe, even Western Europe to help people
25 understand the milieu in which we are operating.

1 MR. USCHOLD: Again on the question of
2 energy. Where does the United States stand as related
3 to the entire world situation now with energy?

4 ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, we stand in a position
5 where we will have a growing requirement for the impor-
6 tation of oil as one of our energy sources, but the
7 problem that we have highlighted in our report from the
8 CIA is a global problem, and it simply is this: that we
9 believe in the next seven or eight years the world
10 demand for energy will exceed the world's capacity to
11 get oil out of the ground.

12 We are not talking about whether there's
13 enough oil down in mother earth to meet our needs; we
14 are only talking about in the short-term: seven or eight
15 years, can the world as a whole get as much out of the
16 ground as it would like to have.

17 MR. USCHOLD: You're saying 1985?

18 ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, we say before 1985:
19 1982 and 1983, somewhere in there there will be a cross-
20 over point where we will want more energy than can
21 physically be brought to the surface, and that means
22 either you've got to cut down or you've got to pay a
23 higher price --

24 MR. USCHOLD: That's in oil that you're talking
25 about..

1 ADMIRAL TURNER: In oil. Now we have taken
2 into account here how much nuclear power, how much coal,
3 how much gas is likely to be available in that mid-term.

4 Other solutions like lots more nuclear power
5 may solve that problem over the longer run, but it takes
6 about ten years to get a nuclear power plant going in
7 this country.

8 So if it isn't on the drawing board today, we
9 didn't take credit for it. But we made all those
10 estimates, and we just think there will be a pressure
11 on the price of oil because of a greater demand than
12 availability of supply sometime in the next seven or
13 eight years.

14 We really don't think that will come to pass
15 because we think people will take action, but that's
16 what we are trying to point out needs to be done.

17 MR. USCHOLD: Do you see a problem now with
18 the Soviet Union as opposed -- as a result of this
19 shortage?

20 ADMIRAL TURNER: The major factor driving our
21 conclusion in this study was an estimate that the Soviet
22 Union will become a net importer of oil rather than a
23 net exporter, that they have trouble in their oil indus-
24 try, and that it's just over the horizon, and that their
25 production, which is still going up, will by the early

1 1980's peak and drop off sharply.

2 Now that's a conclusion open to dispute.
3 Though we find that most of the oil experts outside the
4 Government tend to agree with us that there will be a
5 drop-off in Soviet production, people have different
6 estimates of how rapidly.

7 And if that's the case and the Soviets don't
8 export oil but, in fact, are looking for oil, whether
9 they actually buy it or not there will be pressure on
10 the oil market as a result of this.

11 MR. USCHOLD: Admiral Turner, we have time
12 for one more question. Looking down the road, looking
13 into that crystal ball now, what personal goals and
14 objectives do you have as Director of Central Intelli-
15 gence?

16 ADMIRAL TURNER: The primary goal is to
17 produce for the President, for the Congress, for the
18 Defense Department and the other decision makers in our
19 government as objective intelligence as we can. That's
20 our job: to stand clear of policymaking, stand up and
21 tell people what we think the true situation, the facts
22 are, regardless of whether it supports what they like
23 to hear or not.

24 Secondly, I'd like to be sure that the
25 intelligence community as a whole is adapting to the

1 future: the rapid changes of technology, the rapid change
2 in the political scene around the world.

3 Think how different it is today than it was
4 30 years ago. And I believe because of that difference
5 intelligence is more important than it ever was before.

6 Thirty years ago we were so far superior to
7 anyone else in military power that intelligence while
8 important was not critical.

9 But today when the balance of military power
10 is much closer, if you do not have good intelligence to
11 take advantage of what military strength you have,
12 you may not make it.

13 And all of us in military uniforms should
14 appreciate that because it may be the difference between
15 victory and defeat.

16 Beyond that, John, I'd like to read you a
17 quotation from an invocation that a Navy chaplain,
18 Captain Jude (Senior) gave at my change of command when
19 I left my NATO assignment in Naples a few months ago
20 because I think it also epitomizes what I'd like to do
21 and set as my goal here.

22 I had this framed because I liked it. He
23 said: As the Director of Central Intelligence, may he
24 add wisdom to intelligence to make his work a center
25 of justice and an agency for peace at home and abroad

1 for the family of all mankind.

2 MR. USCHOLD: Admiral Turner, that's excellent,
3 and I want to thank you for being with us on Directions.

4 ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you. I enjoyed this
5 very much.

6 (Whereupon, the program was ended.)